How to Coordinate Integrated Supply Chain When Demand and Cost Disruptions Occur Simultaneously by XIE, Dongchuan et al.
ISSN 1913-0341 [Print] 
ISSN 1913-035X [Online]
www.cscanada.net
www.cscanada.org
Management Science and Engineering
Vol. 9, No. 1, 2015, pp. 14-18
DOI: 10.3968/6219
14Copyright © Canadian Research & Development Center of Sciences and Cultures
How to Coordinate Integrated Supply Chain When Demand and Cost 
Disruptions Occur Simultaneously
XIE Dongchuan[a],*; CHEN Hong[a]; WEI Lai[b]
[a]University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu, 
China.
[b]Sichuan Agricultural University, Chengdu, China.
*Corresponding author.
Supported by National Natural Science Funds of China (71472026); 
Research Fund for the Doctoral Program of Higher Education of China 
(20110185110022); Humanities and Social Sciences Foundation of 
Chinese Ministry of Education (11YJA630141).
Received 16 November 2014; accepted 24 February 2015
Published online  26 March 2015
Abstract
Disruptions such as natural disasters, terrorism attacks, 
major public health events, financial crisis, machine 
failures and strikes etc. may have great impact on the 
operation of supply chain. An originally-coordinated 
supply chain cannot be coordinated because of some 
disruptions and the survival of the supply chain members 
can be influenced by other disruptions. A supply chain 
consisting of one supplier and one retailer is studied in 
this paper. The supply chain profit is maximized in the 
basic case. Disruption happens which makes the price 
sensitivity coefficient and the production cost changes 
simultaneously. The supplier only needs to adjust the 
retail price if the disruption is in a certain range. The 
supplier needs to adjust the retail price and the production 
quantities if the disruption is large enough. Finally, some 
numerical examples are illustrated to certify the results 
derived in this paper.
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INTRODUCTION
Disruptions such as natural disasters, terrorism attacks, 
major public health events, financial crisis, machine 
failures and strikes etc. may have certain impact on 
the business operation and supply chain management. 
An originally-coordinated supply chain cannot be 
coordinated because of some disruptions and the survival 
of the supply chain members can be influenced by other 
disruptions.
For example, Ford’s procurement system reacts 
to “9 • 11” attacks slowly, its supply of engines and 
drive parts suspends for a long time, which makes 
five companies affiliated with Ford in north America 
close temporarily. Therefore, the losses in this accident 
are heavy. The demand for tents and moving shelters 
increases dramatically in the disaster areas after the 
Wenchuan Earthquake on May 12th, 2008. And, a lot of 
enterprises in manufacturing tents have to work overtime 
in order to meet the demand, which affects the operation 
of the related supply chain system. Recently, with the 
development of e-commerce, shopping online is widely 
spread all over China. According to the statistics, the 
total sale volume in Alibaba is about 57.1 billion RMB 
on 11th November, 2014, which has great impact on 
the online and offline supply chain system. The online 
retailers need to order a large number of products in 
advance in order to meet the coming huge demand and 
the logistics system is greatly influenced by the related 
activities such as purchasing, storing, transporting and 
distributing.
As can be seen above, supply chain members’ 
decision, total supply chain profit and even the survival of 
enterprises in supply chains can be affected by disruptions. 
The impact is so serious that it is necessary to study how 
to coordinate supply chains when facing disruptions and 
this has drawn much attention from the enterprises and 
academic world.
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1.  LITERATURE REVIEW
Disruption management is firstly put forward by Clausen 
(2001). It is used to solve the operations of Continental 
Airlines when it faces emergency (Yu, 2003) and the 
airlines company benefits a lot from utilizing the concept. 
A two-stage supply chain when disruption occurs is 
studied by Qi (2004), Xu (2006) and Huang (2006), and 
quantity discount contract is used to coordinate the supply 
chain. The major differences in those studies lie in that 
the market demand functions used are a different form 
and the disruption is different. Qi (2004) studies how 
to coordinate the supply chain when the retailer faces a 
linear demand function and demand disruption occurs. 
Huang (2006) studies the similar problem when the 
retailer faces an exponential demand function. Xu (2006) 
studies a kind of supply chain coordination problem 
with cost disruption when the production cost function 
is a linear function and a convex function, respectively. 
Kleindorfer (2005) puts forward a conceptual model to 
analyze the supply chain disruptions and an example 
is also used to show how to use the conceptual model. 
Xiao (2005) studies a supply chain consisting of one 
manufacturer and two retailers when demand and cost 
disruption occurs and extends the study of a more 
complex problem which exists price competition between 
the two retailers. Tomlin (2006) studies a supply chain 
which exists dual-sourcing supply when the supply chain 
faces disruption risks. Recently, Lei (2012) uses a linear 
contract to coordinate a one-supplier-one-retailer supply 
chain under asymmetric information when demand and 
cost disruptions happen simultaneously.
2.  BASIC MODEL
This paper studies a supply chain composed of one 
supplier and one retailer, in which the supplier is the 
leader of a Stackelberg game. The transaction between 
the supplier and the retailer is done under symmetric 
information. It means that the supplier knows the retailer’s 
cost structure and profit function, and vice versa. The 
supplier sells a kind of short-life-cycle product to the 
retailer according to a production plan which is formulated 
according to market forecast. The retailer decides whether 
or not to buy the product according to the contract the 
supplier offers.
Suppose that p is the retail price and the demand 
function that the retailer faces is a exponential function, 
i.e., d=De-kp. D is the market scale and c is the supplier’s 
unit production cost. The unit retail price is p and the price 
sensitivity coefficient is k (k>0). Q is the real demand 
under the retail price p. Then, the demand function is 
Q=De-hp and the retail price is  Q
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From the first-order condition, we obtain that the 
optimal retail price is
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the optimal production quantity is 
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and the optimal supply chain profit is
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3 .   I N T E G R AT E D  S U P P LY C H A I N 
COORDINATION WHEN DEMAND AND 
PRODUCTION COST DISRUPTIONS 
OCCUR SIMULTANEOUSLY
Integrated supply chain is a system which a supplier 
and a retailer act as a single decision-maker and their 
decisions are made under the same decision-maker. Some 
disruptions occur after the supplier’s production plan is 
formulated. It results in not only the change of the price 
sensitivity coefficient but also the change of the supplier’s 
production cost. The disruptions are captured by the terms 
of Δk and Δc if and only if k+Δk>0 and c+Δc>0, which 
ensure they have real meaning. Therefore, the discussions 
followed are based on the conditions mentioned above.
After the disruptions occur, the demand function is 
d=De-(k+Δk)p. The market scale is Q=De-(k+Δk)p and the retail 
price is 
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supply chain profit function is written as
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The parameters λ1>0 and λ2>0 in the equation are the 
marginal costs related to the change of the market scale 
and (x)+=max{0,x}. λ1 is extra increased unit cost due to 
increase production plan and λ2 is the extra unit disposal 
cost due to sell the remained products in the secondary 
market at the price lower than the marginal production 
cost when the supply is greater than the demand. In order 
to further discuss the effect of the disruption mentioned 
above on the original production plan, we put forward the 
lemma below.
Lemma. I f  the disrupt ions of  the suppl ier ’s 
production cost and the price sensitivity coefficient 
occur simultaneously, we assume that Q* is the optimal 
production quantity which maximizes the supply chain 
profit function shown in Equation (5). Then Q*≥Q
_
 if 
-k<Δk<0 and Δc<0, and Q*≤Q
_
 if Δk>0 and Δc>0.
The lemma illustrates the following results. When 
disruptions make the demand increase and the production 
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cost decrease in the supply chain, the supplier needs to 
meet the enlarged market scale by increasing production 
quantities. When disruptions make the demand decrease 
and the production cost increase in the supply chain, 
the supplier needs to meet the shrunk market scale by 
decreasing production quantities.
According to the lemma, when Δk<0 and Δc<0, Q*≥Q
_
. 
Then optimizing the total supply chain profit function f(Q) 
is equal to optimize the strictly concave function
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Subject to Q*≥Q
_
.
We consider two cases below according to the first-
order necessary condition.
Case 1: 
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When this condition is true, Q*1≥Q
_
. The optimal 
production quantity is Q*case1=De
-[(c+Δc+λ1)(k+Δk)].  The 
corresponding optimal retail price *case1 and the optimal 
supply chain profit f *case1 are shown below: 
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As a consequence, the optimal retail price in this case 
is influenced by the change of the supplier’s production 
cost and the price sensitivity coefficient, and the optimal 
production quantity and the optimal supply chain profit 
are also influenced by the change of the price sensitivity 
coefficient and the supplier’s production cost. 
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When this condition is true, Q*1 does not satisfy Q
*
1≥Q
_
. 
According to the characteristics of con ave function, f1(Q) 
decreases monotonously when Q∈[-∞,Q
_
]. Thus, f1(Q) is 
maximized by Q
_
 and Q*case2=De
-(1+ck). The corresponding 
optimal retail price p*case2 and the optimal supply chain 
profit f *case2 are shown as below:
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As a consequence, the optimal supplier’s production 
quantity in this case is not influenced by the change 
of the price sensitivity coefficient and the supplier’s 
production cost, and they are the original production 
plan. It means that the supplier does not need to change 
production plan in this case but the retail price in this 
case needs to adjust according to the change of the price 
sensitivity coefficient. 
We now consider the case: Where Δk>0 and Δc>0, 
Q*≤Q
_
. Optimizing the total supply chain profit function 
f(Q) is equal to optimize the strictly concave function
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subject to Q*≤Q
_
.
When the disruptions occur, we also consider two 
cases (Case 3 and Case 4). Similar to the analysis used 
above, the corresponding retail price and production 
quantity are obtained.
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When this condition is true, Q*2 ≤ Q
_
. The optimal 
production quantity is Q*case3=De
-[1+(c+Δc-λ2)(k+Δk)]. The 
corresponding optimal retail price p*case3 and the optimal 
supply chain profit f *case3 are shown as below:
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When this condition is true, Q*2 does not satisfy Q
*
2 ≤ Q
_
. 
According to the characteristics of concave function, f2(Q) 
increases monotonously when Q∈[-∞,Q
_
]. Thus, f2(Q) is 
maximized by Q
_
 and Q*case4=De
-[1+ck]. The corresponding 
optimal retail price p*case4 and the optimal supply chain 
profit f *case4 are shown below.
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Summarizing the results above, we have the following 
theorem which shows the decision-maker’s optimal 
decisions in the integrated supply chain when the 
disruptions of the price sensitivity coefficient and the 
supplier’s production cost occur simultaneously.
Theorem.  When disrupt ions  make the  pr ice 
sensitivity coefficient and the supplier’s production 
cost change simultaneously (the deviations of the two 
parameters are Δk and Δc) and the demand function is 
d=De-(k+Δk)p, the decision-maker in the integrated supply 
chain needs to adjust the optimal retail price and the 
optimal production quantities in order to optimize the 
total supply chain profit and realize the supply chain 
coordination. According to different disruptions, the 
optimal retail price p* and the optimal production 
quantity Q* are shown as follows:
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The theorem illustrates the following results. When 
disruptions make the price sensitivity coefficient and the 
supplier’s production cost change simultaneously, there 
exists certain robustness in the original production plan. 
When Δk is in certain range, the original production plan 
does not need to change but the retail price needs to adjust 
in order to compensate for the extra cost derived from 
the disruption. The retail price is only influenced by the 
price sensitivity coefficient and is not correlated to the 
supplier’s production cost. If Δk exceeds certain range, 
the original production plan needs to adjust and the retail 
price also needs to adjust according to the change of the 
market scale. 
4.  NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
We will analyze the effect of the disruptions on the supply 
chain profit by using numerical examples in this section.
Let D=200, c=5 and k=0.3. In the scenario, it is shown 
that the supplier’s optimal production quantity is Q
_
=16.42, 
the optimal retail price is p
_
=8.33 and the optimal supply 
chain profit is f
_
=54.72.
Suppose that λ1=λ2=1, Δk={-0.04,0.04} and Δc=
{-0.5,0.5}. When the disruptions make the price 
sensitivity coefficient and the production cost change at 
the same time, there exist four different disruptions in the 
supply chain system. The supply chain performances are 
shown in Table 1.
Table 1
Supply  Chain  Performance  Under Dif ferent 
Disruptions
Case Δk Δc
The retail 
price
The production 
quantities 
The total supply 
chain profit
p* q* f *
1 -0.04 -0.5 9.35 17.61 84.14
2 -0.04 0.5 9.62 16.42 67.56
3 0.04 -0.5 7.35 16.42 46.84
4 0.04 0.5 7.44 15.93 30.44
As it can be seen from case 2 and case 3 in Table 1, 
if the disruptions make the price sensitivity coefficient 
decrease and the production cost increase or the 
disruptions make the price sensitivity coefficient increase 
and the production cost decrease, there exists no impact 
on the original production plan under certain conditions. 
It means that there exists a balanced relationship between 
the price sensitivity coefficient and the production cost. 
In order to balance the impact of the price sensitivity 
coefficient on the market demand, the original optimal 
product ion plan can remain unchanged but  the 
corresponding retail prices needs to adjust. When the 
disruptions make the price sensitivity coefficient and the 
production cost increase/decrease simultaneously and 
the changes of the two parameters exceed a certain range 
(see Case 1 and Case 4), the optimal production quantity, 
the optimal retail price need to adjust. As it can be seen 
from Case 1 in Table 1, when the disruptions make the 
production cost decrease and the market scale increase, 
the optimal production quantities in the disruptions are 
greater than those in the basic case, and the supplier 
increases the production quantity. As is shown in Case 4, 
when the disruptions make the production cost increase 
and the market scale decrease, the optimal production 
quantities in the disruptions are less than those in the basic 
case, and the supplier decreases the production quantity. 
The supplier’s production plan and coordination strategy 
need to adjust in both cases, which can maximize the total 
supply chain profit. 
CONCLUSION
This paper studies how to coordinate a one-supplier-
one-retailer intetragated supply chain when some 
disruptions make the price sensitivity coefficient and 
the production cost change simultaneously.The supplier 
needs to increase the production quantities in order to 
meet the enlarged market demand when the disruptions 
make the market demand increase and the production cost 
decrease. There exists certain robustness in the original 
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production plan when making decisions. That is to say, 
when the disruptions of the price sensitivity coefficient 
and the production cost satisfy a given condition, the 
original production plan does not need to be adjusted and 
the supplier only need to adjust the retail price in order 
to compensate for the deviation cost derived from the 
disruptions. The production plan and the retail price need 
to adjust only if the disruptions of the price sensitivity 
coefficient and the production cost exceed a certain 
critical point. Finally, some numerical examples are given 
to analyze the supply chain performances when we adopt 
the adjusted strategy. 
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